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Unlabel Their Frankenstein Foods!:
Evaluating a U.S. Challenge to the
European Commission's Labeling
Requirements for Food Products
Containing Genetically-Modified
Organisms
ABSTRACT

The
recent development
of genetically-modified
agriculture has been accepted enthusiastically by the U.S.
agricultural producers, but the European public has
expressed fear that the so-called 'Frankenstein Foods" may
be harmful to health and the environment. Faced with this
public outcry, the European Commission.passed regulations,
which mandated that food products containing geneticallymodified agriculturalproducts be labeled as such. Although
the European Commission appears to have passed its
labeling requirements without express or hidden protective
intent, the regulations stand to make U.S. producers less
competitive in the European market than their European
counterparts. This Note contends that the United States
should challenge the European Commission's labeling
requirements before the World Trade Organization(WTO). It
concludes that the WTO would most likely find that the
labeling requirements violate the 1994 Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and force the
European Commission to repealthe requirements.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The development of genetically-modified agriculture in recent
years has provided benefits that had been unachievable during
the "green revolution" era of Mendel-derived plant breeding.
Genetic engineering is- responsible for crops with greater
resistance to herbicides and pests, foods with longer shelf lives,
and enhanced nutritional properties.' Consumers in the United
States have accepted genetically-modified agriculture with little
dissent. 2 On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, however, their

1.

See generally STEPHEN NOTTINGHAM, EAT YOUR GENES: How GENETICALLY

MODIFIED FOOD IS ENTERING OUR DIET 37-79 (1998) (discussing the developments

that genetic engineering has made possible).
2.
See Nigel Williams, Agricultural Biotech Faces Backlash in Europe, 281
SCIENCE, Aug. 7, 1998, at 768, 768. One commentator indicated that the U.S.
system for governmental approval of genetic engineering has quashed debate
since the system does not require new legislation whenever a new modification
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European
counterparts
have
expressed
fear that
the
"Frankenstein Foods" will cause health and environmental
problems. 3 That fear has spurred several European nations to
regulate
genetically-modified
agriculture
and agricultural
products 4 and motivated the European Commission (EC) to pass
legislation requiring that food products with genetically-modified
material be labeled as such.5
Such regulation, in turn, has
potentially negative consequences for U.S. food producers that
rely on genetically-modified agriculture for a significant share of
their output. 6
The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trades and
Tariffs (GATT) created the World Trade Organization (WTO) to
provide member nations with an arena for challenging the actions
of other member nations that place an undue burden on
international trade. 7
Since the Clinton Administration has
expressed a willingness to challenge trade-burdening actions,8 it
is possible that it may be motivated to bring a complaint before
the WTO against the EC's regulations of genetically-modified
agriculture.

seeks approval. See Bill Lambrecht, World Recoils at Monsanto's Brave New Crops,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 27, 1998, at Al.
3.
See generally James Walsh, Alien Seed?: As Genetically Engineered
Crops Begin to Enter the Food Chain, Europe Remains a Holdout Against What BcoWarriors Call 'FrankensteinFoods", TIME (International Edition), Aug. 24, 1998, at
38 (giving an overview of the European reaction to genetically-modified
agriculture).
4.
See generally id. (listing some of the unilateral regulatory responses).
5.
See Council Regulation 1139/98 of 26 May 1998 Concerning the
Compulsory Indication of the Labeling of Certain Foodstuffs Produced from
Genetically Modified Organisms of Particulars Other than those Provided for in
Directive 79/112/EEC, 1998 O.J. (L 159) 4-7 (Council of the European Union)
[hereinafter Council Regulation 1139/98 of 26 May 1998].
6.
See Williams, supra note 2, at 768 (From a standing start in 1996,
27% of U.S. plantings of soybean are now genetically modified to carry resistance
to herbicides and the share is expected to grow rapidly."); see also Walsh, supra
note 3 (citing a study that suggests that genetically-altered varieties account for
32% of maize and 38% of soya in the United States and perhaps as much as 58%
of Canada's canola oil output).
7.
See generally William R. Sprance, The World Trade Organizationand
United States' Sovereignty: The Political and ProceduralRealities of the System, 13
Am. U. INT'L L. REV. 1225, 1243-50 (1998) (providing a discussion of the Uruguay
Round and the World Trade Organization).
8.
See, e.g., US Trade Negotiator Takes Tough Stance, AGRA EUROPE, May
22, 1998, at EP, available in LEXIS, News Library, Magazine Stories Combined File
(detailing that United States Trade Representative Charlene Barchefsky indicated
that the EC's delay in approval for three varieties of genetically-modified maize
was "very serious" and threatened a "substantial trade row" if the EC did not give
the maize full approval).
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This Note contends that the United States should use the
WTO's dispute-settling process to challenge the EC's labeling
requirements. 9 Part II reviews the development of geneticallymodified agriculture and the European backlash against it. Part
III details the procedure for challenging a perceived restriction on
trade in the WTO. Part IV discusses the relevant provisions of the
Finally, Part V evaluates whether the 'labeling
GATT.
requirements would survive WTO scrutiny. It concludes that the
WTO would find that the requirements violate the GATT
mandates.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF GENETICALLY-MODIFIED AGRICULTURE AND THE

EUROPEAN BACKLASH
The presence of genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) in
agriculture and agricultural products has become commonplace
Genetic
and accepted in the United States in recent years.
engineering has enabled scientists to circumvent a constraint of
traditional, Mendel-derived plant breeding: the impossibility of
cross-fertilization between species.' 0 Now genes may bypass the
11
obstacle of sexual incompatibility and cross the species barrier.
A foreign gene that has been engineered into a variety can then
12
be passed into hybrids, just as in traditional breeding.
Since it approved the first marketing of a genetically-modified
crop in 1994,13 the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (U.S.
FDA) has given its blessing to over thirty GMOs. 14 Today, sizable
proportions of certain crops grown in the United States and
Canada contain genetic modifications.' 5 Moreover, the U.S. food
producers' reliance on GMOs stands to increase. According to
one projection, almost all U.S. crops will be genetically-modified
16
in ten years or will be mixed with genetically-modified products.

Any unilateral regulations relating to genetically modified organisms
9.
(GMOs) that the individual European countries impose would also be subject to a
potential U.S. complaint to the WTO, but they are outside the scope of this note.
See NOTTINGHAM, supranote 1, at 5.
10.
See id.
11.
12.
See id.
The first to be approved in the United States was the 'FlavrSavr"
13.
tomato. See Walsh, supranote 3.
See Williams, supra note 2, at 768.
14.
See Walsh, supranote 3.
15.
See Guy de Jonquie'res, Genetically Modified Trade Wars: Widespread
16.
Worries in Europe About Genetically Modified Crops Could Result in a Transatlantic
Trade War and Even the Worldwide Marginalizationof EuropeanFarming,FIN. TIMES
(London), Feb. 18, 1999, at 15.
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Although these developments have met little resistance in
this country, 17 the European reaction differed dramatically.
Signs of European disfavor with GMOs have been widespread.
Polling data has revealed that high percentages of European
citizens desire the complete segregation of genetically-modified
foods from organically-grown products, and some of those polled
Protest groups of "ecofavor banning GMOs altogether.1 8
warriors" 19 have applied tactics both mild-filling supermarket
carts with food and demanding that cashiers tell them which
brands contain GMOs 2 -and destructive-tearing up test fields
of genetically-modified crops. 2 1 The Prince of Wales has even lent
his voice to the anti-GMO movement; Prince Charles's June 1998
"takes
newspaper commentary proclaimed that such modification
22
man into realms that belong to God, and God alone."
In addition to bioethical considerations, opponents of GMOs
have expressed more concrete fears about the so-called
Frankenstein Foods. Two currents of concern can be identified.
One stems from fear of the ecological consequences of
introducing strange organisms into an ecosystem. 23 An incident
in the fall of 1998 served to heighten this concern: the British
Agriculture Ministry ordered the destruction of an experimental
field of herbicide-resistant oilseed rape because the crop had
Such pollination, if unchecked,
pollinated nearby plants.2 4
threatened to create a new breed of "super weeds," invulnerable

See Williams, supra note 2, at 768.
17.
See, e.g., Richard Kamchen, Gene-Altered Foods Face Uphill Battle in
18.
EU, J. COM., Nov. 5, 1998, at 4A (citing a British poll in which 85% of respondents
called for genetically modified foods to be completely segregated from organicallygrown products and 77%desired that the modified foods be banned altogether).
See Walsh, supranote 3.
19.
See id. (mentioning a Greenpeace protest in Britain).
20.
See id. (relating the assault on a patch of herbicide-resistant oilseed
21.
rape in a town near London). After this crop pollinated nearby plants, the British
See Christopher Leake,
Agriculture Ministry ordered that it be destroyed.
"Supenveed"Scare in Test CropBlunder, MAIL ON SUNDAY, Oct. 25, 1998, at 17.
H.R.H. Charles, Prince of Wales, Seeds of Disaster:HRH the Prince of
22.
Wales, Who Farms Organically, Says the Genetic Modification of Crops is Taking
Mankind into Realms That Belong to God, and God Alone, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 8,
1998, at 16.
See, e.g., id. ("We are told that GM crops will require less use of agro23.
chemicals. Even if this is true, it is certainly not the whole story. What it fails to
take into account is the total ecological and social impact of the farming system.").
See Leake, supra note 21, at 17. In February, 1999, Monsanto pleaded
24.
guilty to a breach of the safety rules and paid a fine equivalent to $28,000. See
Aviva Freudmann, Monsanto PleadsGuilty to AgriculturalMishap in Britain,J. CoM.,
Feb. 18, 1999, at 1A.
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to normal chemicals and capable of rendering fields sterile of
25
plantlfe.
GMO opponents also point to potential health risks for
consumers. These putative risks include the possibility that
GMO foods would expose consumers to new allergens and the
chance that they might upset the natural balance 2of6
microorganisms that live in the human digestive system.
Europe's recent maladies with the effects of science on its diet,
27
such as mad-cow disease, contribute to this wariness.
Underlying all of these fears seems to be the notion that the
corporations responsible for GMOs may be inclined to ignore
ecological and health concerns in favor of increasing profits. 2 8
No scientific study offers evidence that consumption of the
three genetically-modified agricultural products accepted for sale
in the EC-Monsanto's pest-resistant maize, AgrEvo's herbicideresistant maize, and Novartis's pest and herbicide-resistant
maize 2 9-is hazardous to human health.3 0 The fact that all of the
organisms at issue have passed the demanding tests of the U.S.
FDA bolsters claims that products are safe. 3 ' Nevertheless, some
scientists have challenged the alleged safeness of GMOs. The
32
findings of Dr. Arnpad Pusztai have drawn the most attention.
After he fed genetically-modified potatoes to rats, Dr. Pusztai
discovered internal organ damage, weight loss, and immunesystem problems. 3 3 Dr. Pusztai, who was forced to retire from

25.
See Leake, supranote 21, at 17.
26.
See Walsh, supranote 3.
27.
See id.
28.
See, e.g., Alan Simpson, A First Victory Against Those Who Want To Play
God, EVENING STANDARD (London), Feb. 10, 1999, at 13 ("Big business has too
much at stake to allow doubts about the science, the safety and the consequences
to stand in the way of a large monopoly profit."); see also Walsh, supra note 3
(quoting Gill Lacroix, a Brussels-based biotech monitor for Friends of the Earth,
"Let's not fool ourselves. Monsanto is not in this to feed the world or improve the
environment. The bottom line is to improve their balance sheet and profits for
their shareholders.").
29.
See Walsh, supranote 3 (listing genetically-modified crops approved for
sale in the EC).
The reaction to Dr. Arpad Pusztai's findings on the alleged harmfulness
30.
of genetically-modified potatoes suggests that they are the only instance of a
scientific study that contends that GMOs are harmful. See, e.g., Jim Mclean,
Food Facts They Tried To Hide: Gagged Scientist Had Warned the Government of GM
'Time Bomb' DAILY REc. (Scot.), Feb. 17, 1999, at 4; see also Williams, supranote
2, at 769 (" . . . regulatory bodies have determined that the modified soybeans

present no health hazards...").
31.
See Charles Arthur, Why I'm Quite Happy To Eat Genetically Modified
Food: Ignore Your Natural Distrust of Government Spin Doctors' Efforts To Generate
Good Publicity, THE INDEP. (London), Feb. 16, 1999, at 4.
See Mclean, supra note 30, at 4.
32.
33.
See id.

20001

EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S LABELING REQUIREMENTS

189

the Rowett Research Institute after his disclosure sparked
charges of high meddling, further contended that he could find
34
scant scientific proof supporting the safety of the GMOs.
Additionally, some scientists have expressed nagging fears that
the available studies, while vouching for short-term GMO safety,
provide no proof that the GMOs will not bring adverse long-term
35
consequences.
In response to the anti-GMO pressures, several European
governments have passed legislation regulating, or even banning,
the production and sale of food products containing GMOs.
Austria and Luxembourg have prohibited the production of the
three strains of EC-approved genetically-modified maize, while
Norway has banned all products from crops containing antibioticresistance marker genes. 3 6 Britain has introduced a program of
"managed development," which involves a ban on insect-resistant
crops and strict scrutiny of any others.3 7 France has adopted a
"go-slow" policy for approving any new varieties for sale.3 8 The
coalition government in Germany, which includes members of the
39
Green party, has agreed to labeling requirements.
Although these unilateral regulations could harm the export
success of GMO-reliant U.S. food producers, any Europe-wide
restrictions passed by the EC would stand to cause greater harm.
Having approved just three genetically-altered food plants for
commercial growth within its borders, 40 the EC has been more
lukewarm than the United States in accepting GMOs. In May
1998, the EC adopted regulations requiring the labeling of all
foods and food ingredients "produced, in whole or in part, from
... genetically modified soya beans [or] genetically modified
maize."4 1

The regulations asserted that their purpose was to provide
uniform labeling rules for foods and food ingredients containing

34.
See id.
35.
See Andy Richards, Dream or Nightmare?: Blue Grass, Chocolate
Cabbage ... How Genes Controversy Could Be Just the Beginning, BIRMINGHAM
EVENING MAIL, Feb. 18, 1999, at 6 (quoting Ralph Early, Senior Lecturer in Food
Science at the Harper Adams University College at Newport, Shropshire, "With GM
goods we cannot be sure of the long-term consequences. Many are likely to be
safe, but in some cases regular exposure over half the lifetime of a human may be
required to reveal problems. Who truly knows?").
36.
See Williams, supranote 2, at 768.
37.
See Kevin O'Sullivan, Pressure on EU May Result in Temporary
Restrictionson Genetically Modified Crops, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 23, 1998, at 2.
38.
See Walsh, supra note 3.
39.
See O'Sullivan, supra note 37, at 2.
40.
See Walsh, supra note 3.
41.
Council Regulation 1139/98 of 26 May 1998, supranote 5, art. 1.1
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GMOs. 4 2 In the EC's view, uniformity was necessary because
"certain member states" had adopted individual measures for
labeling the products, and any differences were "liable to impede
the free movement of those foods and food ingredients and
thereby adversely affect the functioning of the internal market."4
Additionally, the regulations sought to inform consumers of "any
characteristic or food property" that "renders a food or food
ingredient no longer equivalent to an existing food or food
Absent from the regulations was any explicit
ingredient." 44
by a
acknowledgment that the requirements were motivated
45
desire to protect human health or the environment.
After indicating that the labeling requirements had to be
"based on a scientific evaluation," clear to enforce, and "no more
burdensome than necessary but sufficiently detailed to supply
consumers with the information they require," the regulations
concluded that making distinctions based on the presence of
protein or DNA resulting from genetic modification would satisfy
those requirements.4 6 The regulations then declared that food
and food ingredients produced from genetically-modified soya and
maize are not equivalent to any existing foods and food
ingredients and, for that reason, should be subject to labeling
These regulations excluded food additives,
requirements. 4 7
in
flavorings for use in foodstuffs, and extraction solvents used
48
the production of foodstuffs from the labeling requirements.
To satisfy the labeling requirements a producer must include
the words "produced from genetically modified soya" or "produced
from genetically modified maize" in the list of ingredients, a
footnote to the list of ingredients, or some other clear location on
The regulations indicated that the labeling
the product.4 9
requirements were minimum requirements and were not to be
interpreted as barring producers from including any additional
50
information about the properties of their products.
Five months later, the EC announced its intent to remove the
exemption for food additives, flavorings for use in foodstuffs, and
extraction solvents used in the production of foodstuffs. 5 '

42.
43.

See ic- 14.
Id.

44.

Id.

45.

See generally id

9.

46.
Id. 77 10-13.
16.
47.
See id.
48.
See id. art. 1.2.
49.
Id. art. 2.3 (a)-(b).
50.
See id. 20.
51.
See Commission Decision 98/613/EC of 21 Oct. 1998 Concerning a
Draft Decree of the Republic of Austria on the Identification of Genetically
Modified Additives and Flavourings Used as Food Ingredients, 1998 O.J. (L 291)
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Observers regarded the change as a response to increased
consumer pressure. 52 Officially, the impetus for the change was
Austria's attempt to pass a unilateral measure that surpassed the
EC's regulations by requiring labeling of all products containing
GMOs.5 3 Asserting that such regulatory variance "would be sure
to hinder intra-Community trade,"s 4 the EC required Austria to
suspend the adoption of its regulation for twelve months.5 5 The
Commission pointed out, however, that "it is important" for
consumers "to be informed about the use of additives or
flavourings genetically modified or produced by genetic
engineering,"5 6 and resolved that "the most satisfactory solution
... will be to draw up a Community [labeling] provision."5 7 With
this amendment, all foods with GMOs would be included in the
labeling requirements.5 "
While the EC regulations apply to food produced within the
European Union only, it is likely that products produced
elsewhere will be forced to follow these requirements. s 9 When
European-produced
products are labeled, GMO-conscious
consumers will be unwilling to purchase a food product with a
label that contains no information on GMOs or one that makes
vague references to the possibility that GMOs are present.6 0
This creates several problems for U.S. agricultural producers
and food makers that rely on GMOs for a large percentage of their
output. Foremost, any labeling requirement forces them to brand
their products in a fashion that will be certain to repulse a
significant portion of the European populace. Moreover, it is
difficult for the food producers that use GMOs to certify that a
given food product contains GMOs. 6 1 Because the altered crops
look the same as "normal" ones, segregating the two groups
during harvesting, storage, and transport is difficult.6 2
To

35, 1 4-8 (European Commission) [hereinafter Commission Decision 98/613/EC
of 21 Oct. 1998]; see also Kevin O'Sullivan, Consumer Victory as EU Broadens
Rules on the Labeling of GM Foods, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 13, 1998, at 5.
52.
See O' Sullivan, supranote 51. Previously, the EC had rejected Greensponsored attempts to amend the labeling requirements. See id.
53.
See Commission Decision 98/613/EC of 21 Oct. 1998, supra note 51,
11 1-2.
54.
Id. 6.
55.
See id. art. 1.
56.
Id. 6.
57.
Id. 10.
58.
See O'Sullivan, supra note 51, at 5.
59.
See Tracking Down the GMOs, FooD MANUFACTURE, Sept. 1998, at 69.
60.
See id.
61.
See Robert Koenig, Complex Array of Label Rules Gives US Exporters
Headaches,J. COM., Jan. 11, 1999, at 7A.
62.
See id.
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overcome this problem, one U.S. producer desiring to avoid the
"Contains GMO"-label developed an "Identity Preservation
63
System" that tracks its soybeans from the farm to the store.
Nevertheless, developing the system was expensive," and most
U.S. farmers-many of whom can cite financial benefits from
GMOs-lack a mechanism to separate genetically-modified
products before exporting their output. 6 s Finally, as originally
promulgated, the GMO-labeling legislation stood to create
confusion for even those producers that would be able to
segregate their products. 6 6 The confusion can be blamed on the
EC's failure to set a minimum level of genetically-modified
ingredients below which no labeling would be required and to
67
specify a specific criteria for testing for GMOs.
The Clinton Administration has expressed a willingness to
challenge trade measures that it considers unfair burdens on
U.S. producers; it has also professed a desire to encourage the
development of biotechnology. 68 In the past, the possibility of
European regulation of GMOs prompted threats of trade
battles.6 9 Although the Clinton Administration has not spoken
on the labeling requirements, it is possible that it would challenge
them if it felt they impaired U.S. trade interest significantly.
Considering that the GMO-labeling requirements stand to force
agricultural producers to choose between incurring
U.S.
substantial expenses to prove to European consumers that GMOs
are absent from their products and labeling those products in a
fashion that would deter a large portion of the consumer public,
The
challenging the labeling requirements would be wise.
revamped dispute mechanism of the WT0 70 provides the United
GMO-labeling
challenge the
arena to
States with the
requirements.

63.
See id.
64.
See id.
U.S. farmers using GMOs are reporting savings of as much as 50 cents
65.
per bushel of soybeans. See Lambrecht, supranote 2, at Al.
66.
See Koenig, supranote 61, at 7A.
See id.
67.
68.
See, e.g., Sprance, supra note 7 (giving an example of the Clinton
Administration's stance toward protecting United States interests in these
matters); "Aggressive Action" on Trade Barriers Needed, AGRA EUROPE, May 22,
1998, at EP available in LEXIS, News Library, Magazine Stories Combined File
(indicating that President Clinton had asserted that the WTO "must develop rules
rooted in science which will encourage the full fruits of biotechnology.").
See id.
69.
70.
See generally Sprance, supra note 7, at 1243-50 (discussing changes
made in the Uruguay Round).
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III. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION'S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
MECHANISM

The 1994 Uruguay GATT significantly altered the
adjudication of international trade disputes. While previous
GATT agreements had been plagued by ineffective disputesettlement mechanisms, the Uruguay Round sought to make the
process more judicial. 7 1 It accomplished this goal with the
Dispute Settlement Mechanism that it included in the new
WTO. 72 The WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is responsible
for consultations and dispute settlement. GATT has empowered
it to establish Panels, adopt Panel and Appellate Body reports,
and ensure the implementation of Panel rulings. 73
A. Challenginga Trade Regulation in the WTO
Only WTO member states have standing to bring grievances
before the DSB. 7 4 No private party may bring an action. 75 In
practice, when a private party feels that a government's action
may have violated some aspect of the Uruguay Round, it will try
to convince its home state to act on its behalf. This happened

71.
See generallyid.
72.
Three major flaws hindered the original GATT dispute-settlement
process: (1) the party defending against a trade complaint could block the
formation of an adjudicatory Panel; (2) after a ruling, the unsuccessful party could
block the report; and (3) if the report were adopted, the unsuccessful party could
refuse to comply without fear of retaliation. See Sarah Hogg & Mahmud Nawaz,
Economic Considerationsand the DSU, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANISATION 59, 59 (James Cameron & Karen Campbell eds., 1998).
The
Uruguay Round eliminated those possibilities. See id. at 59-60. The voting
procedure is now weighted against miscreants; a party wishing to block a Panel's
report needs a consensus vote. See id. at 60. Although the rulings are not selfexecuting, they do expose defiant members to the possibility of retaliatory action.
See id.
73.
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (the Uruguay Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 112, 114, art. 2.1
[hereinafter DSU]. This Note will use the abbreviation "DSB" interchangeably with
the names of the Dispute Settlement Body's component parts, the WTO Panel and
Appellate Body.
74.
See James Cameron & Karen Campbell, Challenging the Boundaries of
the DSU Through Trade and Environment Disputes, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION, supranote 72, at 204, 226.
75.
See it. Some have contended that private parties should be able to
submit amicus curaie briefs to the DSB, or be able to intervene on their own. See
id. at 226-27.
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when the United States, acting at Monsanto's urging, challenged
the EC's restrictions on beef hormones in 1996.76
The WTO has provided a three-stage process for such
challenges: (1) consultation, (2) Panel hearing, and (3) appeal.
Initially, the challenging party must request that the offending
party enter into consultations to negotiate a mutually acceptable
solution. 7 7 The challenged nation may avoid such negotiation
entirely by refusing to enter the consultations.7" If the challenged
state agrees to negotiate, the parties have sixty days from the
beginning of the consultations to resolve the dispute; if they have
not reached an agreement at that point, or the challenged nation
has refused to negotiate in the first place, the challenging state is
79
permitted to request that a Panel decide the issue.
B. The WTO's Dispute Settlement Panel
Although the Panel process was a feature of previous GATT
dispute-settlement mechanisms, the current incarnation is0
8
regarded as a significant improvement over its predecessors.
For the first time, maximum time limits have been established for
each stage of the dispute settlement process. 8 ' Additionally,8 the
2
Panelists are now required to have extensive trade experience.
The WTO Panel, which consists of three individuals, is
entrusted to make "an objective assessment of the facts of the
case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant
covered agreements."8 3 To do so, it may seek information and
advice from any individual or body it deems appropriate.8 4 Once
the parties agree on the Panel's composition, it must conclude its
8s
work in six months.
After hearing arguments from both sides, the Panel submits
an interim report to the parties. 8 6 Both members may register
87
objections before the report moves to the DSB for consideration.

76.
See NOTINGHAM, supra note 1, at 115.
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade
77.
Negotiations (the Uruguay Round): Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade
Organization, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13, 17, art. 4.4 [hereinafter WTO
Agreement].
See i&. art. 4.7.
78.
79.
See id.
80.
See Sprance, supranote 7, at 1247-48.
See id. at 1247-48.
81.
82.
See DSU, supranote 73, art 8.1; Sprance, supra note 7, at 1248.
83.
DSU, supranote 73, art. 11.
84.
See id. art. 13.1.
85.
See id. art. 12.8.
86.
See id. arts. 3.7, 12.6, 15.2.
87.
See id. arts. 16.1-16.2.
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The DSB will adopt the report, unless a party decides to appeal or
all members of the board agree that it should not adopt the
report.8 8 The requirement of a consensus to block the Panel
report is one of the major differences between the WTO and its
predecessors; previously, the disagreement of a single member
state was sufficient for blocking the report.8 9 If a party notifies
the DSB of its intention to appeal the report, the DSB will not
adopt the report until after the Appellate Body decides the
90
appeal.
Once the DSB has adopted the report, the affected party has
thirty days to notify the board of its intentions regarding

implementation. 9 1 The GATT empowers the DSB to monitor the
implementation of its reports permanently. 9 2 If a member fails to
implement a Panel recommendation or provide compensatory
benefits within a reasonable time, the DSB will sanction that
member automatically. 93 In the event of a disagreement on the
amount and duration of sanctions or time for compliance, the
94
member has a right to arbitration.
C. The WTO's Appellate Body
Seven members serving four-year terms constitute the DSB's
standing Appellate Body, another innovation of the Uruguay
Round. 95 The original parties to the dispute hold the exclusive
right of appeal, although a third party who has notified the DSB
of a substantial interest in the case may make written
submissions and be heard by the Appellate Body. 9 6
Three of the seven members hear an appeal. 9 7 Their review
is limited to issues of law and legal interpretation. 98 If it finds
that a measure is inconsistent with a WTO agreement, the
Appellate Body will recommend that the offending party bring its
trade measures into conformity with the appropriate
agreements. 9 9 Absent consensus not to adopt, the DSB will

88.
See id. art. 16.4.
89.
See Hogg & Nawaz, supranote 72, at 59-60.
90.
See DSU, supranote 73, art. 16.4.
91.
See id. art. 21.3.
92.
See id This is another innovation of the Uruguay Round.
Sprance, supra note 7, at 1249.
93.
See DSU, supranote 73, art. 22.
94.
See id. art. 25.1.
95.
See id. arts. 17.1-17.2.
96.
See id. art. 17.4.
97.
See id. art. 17.2.
98.
See id. art. 17.6.
99.
See id. arts. 19-19.1.

See
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adopt the Appellate Body's report within thirty days after its
0°
circulation to DSB members.1
IV. APPLICABLE LAW
Strictly speaking, WTO Panel and Appellate Body report
rulings and conclusions are considered to apply only to the
matter and parties in the particular case before them.1 0 1 The
02
system has no concept of universally-binding stare decisis.1
The Appellate Body, however, has recognized that prior decisions
are important, since the precedents create legitimate expectations
among WTO members.1 0 3 WTO cases contain many references to
previous cases and prior interpretations of the GAIT, so one
cannot be sure of the extent to which precedents are being
ignored.10 4
The GATT strives to promote the international economy by
reducing barriers to trade and eliminating protective treatment of
domestic goods. 10 5 It especially disfavors national laws that
protect domestic goods at the expense of imports. 106 Two
sections of the GATT agreement work to prohibit discrimination
against imports.1 0 7 Article III, the national treatment clause,
forbids internal taxes and regulations that serve as protection for
domestic production.1 0 8
Article XI prohibits restrictions on
import quantities.' 0 9 The difference between Articles III and XI is
that Article III applies to measures that affect the qualities of
imported products, while Article XI applies to measures that
affect the importation of products. 1 10
If a regulation violates Article III or Article XI, it still may be
permissible, as long as it qualifies under a GATT exception.1 1 1
GATT Article XX contains the general exceptions that a regulating
member may invoke to maintain a regulation that otherwise

100. See id.art. 17.14.
101. See Debra P. Steger & Susan M. Hainsworth, New Directions in
International Trade Law WTO Dispute Settlement, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supranote 72, at 28, 37-38.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See generally id.
105. See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
106. See id-arts. III & XI.
107. See Rick Franzen, Will GATT Take a Bite Out of the Organic Food
ProductionAct of 1990?, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 399, 408 (1998).
108.
See GATT, supra note 105, art. III.
109.
See id. art. XI.
110.
See Franzen, supra note 107, at 409.
111.
See id.
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violates the GATT.n 2 Two products of the Uruguay Round, the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement) and the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), have restricted the use of
Article XX defenses, however.' 1 3 The SPS Agreement requires
that measures aimed at protecting human, animal, or plant life
have a scientifically supported and verifiable basis;" 4 the TBT
Agreement requires that packaging, marketing, and labeling
requirements not create unnecessary barriers to international
trade or unjustifiably or arbitrarily discriminate against
imports. 115 Additionally, Article XI contains internal exceptions
that a regulating member can invoke without having to rely on
Article XX."

6

Determining whether a regulation would survive a WTO
challenge requires a two-step inquiry. The first step is to select
the provision that governs the regulation; the second is to decide
whether the regulation satisfies the requirements of the provision.
In most cases, it is possible to argue that several different
provisions of the GATT could cover a given regulation, depending
on how the WTO elects to categorize it. When one member
challenges the regulations of another, the respective parties will
attempt to convince the WTO Panel of the appropriate governing
provision.
This process can take two paths.
First, the
challenging member can prove to the Panel that the regulation
represents a prima facie violation of a GATT provision. 1 7 In that
situation, the intersection between the violation and the
regulating member's affirmative defense will determine the
governing law.1 1 8 Additionally, one or both of the disputing
parties can contend that a Uruguay Round provision, operating

112. See GATT, supranote 105, art. XX.
113. See Franzen, supra note 107, at 409.
114. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, GAIT Doc. MTN/FA II-AIA-4, art. 2.2 (Dec. 15, 1993) reprinted in THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL
TEXTS 69, 70 (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
115.
See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GAIT Doc. MTN/FA IIAIA-6, preamble (Dec. 15, 1993) reprintedin THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 114, at 138

[hereinafter TBT Agreement].
116.
See GATT, supranote 105, art. XI, 2. ("The provisions of paragraph 1
of this article shall not extend to the following [exceptions] .... ").
117.
See, e.g., Franzen, supra note 107, at 412-13 (describing the procedure
of a GAIT Article III claim, which involves the challenging member proving a
prima facie violation and the regulating member asserting an affir-mative defense).
118.
See id.
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1 9
This happened
independent of the GATT, is the governing law.'
in the Beef Hormone case of 1996. In that case, the United States
successfully challenged an EC ban on the administration of
growth promotion hormones to farm animals and the sale of
domestic and imported meat from animals that had received
those hormones, which was passed in response to the "mad cow"
The United States argued that the WTO should
scare. 12 0
121
The WTO agreed, and
consider the ban a sanitary measure.
evaluated the regulation under the SPS Agreement without
investigating whether the EC's ban was an underlying GATT
22
violation. 1
Choosing the appropriate provision requires answering a
series of questions involving the characterization of the
For the GMO-labeling requirements,
challenged regulation.' 23
be
the analysis begins by asking whether the regulation should
124
If
considered sanitary measures or non-sanitary measures.
the labeling requirements are judged to be sanitary measures, the
inquiry moves to the second prong, and the requirements must
satisfy the SPS Agreement to be sustained.
If they are considered non-sanitary measures, the analysis
must include another characterization inquiry: whether the
regulations attempt to control the imported products as products
or whether they seek to control the process of production of the
If they are found to regulate the products as
products. 125
products, they can be challenged under the TBT Agreement and
must meet its requirements.' 2 6 If, on the other hand, they are
viewed as a process regulation, they can be challenged as import

See, e.g., id. at 417 (describing how the United States persuaded the
119.
WTO Panel to analyze the Beef Hormone case under the SPS Agreement, without
examining for an underlying GAT violation).
See Layla Hughes, Note, Limiting the Jurisdiction of Dispute Settlement
120.
Panels: The WTO Appellate Body Beef Hormone Decision, 10 GEO. INTIL ENVrL. L.
REV. 915, 917 (1998).
See Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
121.
(Hormones), Complaint by the United States, Aug. 18, 1997, DS26/R/USA, 1997
WL 569984, "18, 4.5 [hereinafter Beef Hormone Panel Report].
122.
See id. The WTO Panel found that "there is no requirement... that a
prior violation of a GATT provision need be established before the SPS Agreement
applies." Id. at* 192, 8.41
See generally Franzen, supra note 107, at 420-29 (describing a
123.
potential challenge to the U.S. Organic Food Production Act of 1990 under GATT).
124. See id. at 423.
See id. (explaining that analysis as a non-sanitary measure under
125.
GATT can be approached either as a product regulation or as a process
regulation).
See id. at 426 ("As a product regulation, the OFPA [Organic Food
126.
Production Act of 19901 is open to challenge under.., the TBT Agreement .... ').

2000]

EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S LABELiNG REQUIREMENTS

199

restrictions under Article XI, and must satisfy its internal
127
conditions.
A. Determining Whether the Regulation Is a SanitaryRegulation
The first step in evaluating how the WTO would analyze the
GMO-labeling requirements is characterizing those requirements
as sanitary measures or non-sanitary measures. 128 The SPS
Agreement, designed to control regulations classified as "sanitary"
or "phytosanitary," defines a sanitary or phytosanitary measure
as one applied "to protect human life or health . . . from risks
arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing
organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs." 12 9 If the challenged
regulations are viewed as sanitary measures, they must satisfy
the requirements of the SPS Agreement; if not, they would be
covered by the TBT Agreement and Article XI. i3 0
There are two ways the WTO classifies a regulation as a
sanitary measure. First, as happened in the Beef Hormone case,
one or both of the disputing parties can persuade the WTO Panel
that the regulation is a sanitary measure and, as such, should be
governed by SPS Agreement.' 3 1 This is possible because the SPS
Agreement, according to the WTO Panel, has independent
significance from the GATT. The Panel found that "there is no
requirement... that a prior violation of a GATT provision need be
32
established before the SPS Agreement applies."'
To move directly to the SPS Agreement, the parties would
have to establish two elements to the satisfaction of the WTO
Panel: (1) that the regulation has a sanitary or phytosanitary
purpose, and (2) that it "may, directly or indirectly, affect
international trade."133 The second test is not an empirical
standard; the parties need not show proof that the regulation has
reduced the flow of trade.' 3 4 Rather, in the second step the
parties must show that the measure applies to imported

127. See id. at 423 (rIfthe OFPA [Organic Food Production Act of 19901 is
instead viewed as a process regulation, it could be challenged as an import
restriction under Article XI.")
128. See id. at 420.
129. SPS Agreement, supranote 114, Annex A, 1.
130. See supranotes 120-24 and accompanying text.
131. See Franzen, supra note 7 at 412-17; supra notes 117-19 and
accompanying text.
132. See Beef Hormone Panel Report, supra note 121, at *192, 8.41.
133. Dale E. McNiel, The First Case Under the WTO's Sanitary and
PhytosanitaryAgreement. The European Union's Hormone Ban, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 89,
113(1998).
134. See id.
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products; if it does, it can be presumed to have a negative effect
135
on trade.
The regulation can also be scrutinized as a sanitary
regulation if the challenging member can establish that the
regulation is contrary to GATT Article 111.136 To show a prima
facie violation of Article III, the challenging party must
demonstrate three things. 13 7 First, the measure must be an
internal regulation. 1 3 8 GATT defines an internal regulation as
any governmental action that applies to all goods, whether foreign
or domestic. I3 9 Second, the regulation must affect the sale
purchase, or use of the product. 14 ° This requirement has been
interpreted broadly; a sale is affected if the regulation directly
governs the conditions of the sale or when it may "adversely
modify the conditions of competition between the domestic and
imported products on the internal market." 14 1 Finally, the
products affected must be "like" those domestic products that the
measure in question protects. 14 2 Factors in determining whether
products are "alike" include customer preferences, tariff
classification,
end use, and physical properties
and
characteristics. 143

If the challenging member establishes these elements, the
regulating member can defend its regulation by raising an
affirmative defense under Article XX.144 An Article XX defense of
the EC's GMO-labeling requirement would be that it is a sanitary
measure, designed to protect human health or the
environment. 145
If the regulating member asserts that the
regulation is a sanitary measure, the challenging member must
demonstrate that the regulation fails to satisfy the requirements
of the SPS Agreement.

135. See U
136. See Franzen, supranote 107, at 413.
137. See id. at 412.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 413 (quoting Panel on "Italian Discrimination Against Imported
Agricultural Machinery," Oct. 23, 1958, GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 60 (1959)).
142.
See U at 412.
143.
See id. at 413 (citing Panel on "Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and
Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages," Nov. 10, 1988,
GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 83).
144. See id.
145. See id.
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B. WTO Evaluationof a SanitaryMeasure: The SPS Agreement
Although GATT member states designed Article III to prevent
trade discrimination by requiring members to treat domestic and
foreign products identically,'" they carved out an exception in
Article XX for discriminatory measures that are "necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health."14 7 The SPS
Agreement is the WTO's means for applying this exception to
measures implemented to protect against pests, diseases, and
risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins, or diseasecausing organisms in food. 148 In other words, it "strives to clarify
the situations under which discrimination is permissible to
protect health and the environment." 1 49
The WTO's DSB has had three opportunities to interpret the
SPS Agreement.' 5 0
In all three disputes, it overturned the
challenged regulations because they failed to satisfy the
Agreement. The first was the Beef Hormone case.' 5 ' Later, the
DSB upheld a Canadian challenge to an Australian ban on the
52
importation of fresh, chilled, and frozen salmon from Canada.'
Finally, the DSB, at the urging of the United States, struck down
a Japanese requirement that banned individual varieties of some
agricultural products from importation until each variety had
been tested for the required quarantine treatment.' s 3
The
Appellate Body's conclusions of law in the Beef Hormone and
Salmon cases and the Panel's conclusions in the JapanAgriculturalcase are not binding on future SPS Agreement cases,
but they are indicative of the approach that the Panel and
54
Appellate Body would be likely to take.'

146. GATT, supranote 105, art. III, 4.
147. Id. art. XX(b), l(b).
148. See SPS Agreement, supranote 114, Annex A, 1.
149. Hughes, supranote 120, at 917.
150. See Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, The SPS Agreement of the
World Trade Organizationand International Organizations: The Roles of the Codex
Alimentarius Commission, the International Plant Protection Convention, and the
InternationalOffice of Epizootics, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT L L. & CoM. 27, 34.

151. See supranotes 119-22 and accompanying text.
152. Australia had contended that the prohibition was necessary to protect
fish from diseases that could enter the country through the imported salmon. See
Stewart & Johanson, supranote 150, at 36.
153.
See id. at 39. Unlike the other two disputes decided under the SPS
Agreement, which advanced to the Appellate Body, the Japan-Agriculture case
was heard at the Panel level only at the time of writing this note. See id. at 40.
The Japanese intend to appeal the findings of the Panel. Id.
154.
See DSU, supranote 73; supranotes 86-90 and accompanying text.
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It is possible that the EC's GMO-labeling requirements could
violate the SPS Agreement in three ways: (1) the SPS Agreement's
"scientifically supported/necessary" requirement; 155
(2) the
"arbitrary or unjustifiable distinction" requirement;1 5 6 and (3) the
"international standards" requirement.1 5 7 A sanitary measure
must satisfy all three to gain the blessing of the DSB.
The "scientifically supported/necessary" requirement, as
dictated by Articles 2.2, 5.1, and 5.6, has two elements. 158 Under
the "scientifically supported" prong, a sanitary measure must be
"based on" a risk assessment and not "maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence."' 5 9 The "necessary" prong requires
that the measure be necessary for achieving the regulating
0
member's selected level of protection.16
The Beef Hormone case provided significant interpretations of
the "risk assessment" and "scientific evidence" elements of the
"scientifically supported" prong.
Its guidance on the "risk
assessment" element is particularly helpful. Article 5.1 of the
SPS Agreement requires members to base their SPS measures "on
an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks
to human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk
assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
SPS Agreement Annex A defines a risk
organizations." 16 1
assessment as the
evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a
pest or disease within the territory of an importing Member
according to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures which might
be applied... [or] the evaluation of the potential for adverse effects
on human or animal health arising from the presence of additives,
contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food,
16 2
feedstuffs and beverages.

155. The "scientifically supported/necessary" requirement is mandated by
Articles 2.2, 5.1 and 5.6. See Ven R. Walker, Keeping the WTOfrom Becoming the
'World Trans-science Organization": ScientifjTc Uncertainty, Science Policy and
Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 251, 271-72
(1998).
156. The "arbitrary or unjustifiable distinction" finds its source of authority
in Article 2.3. See McNiel, supranote 133, at 127-28.
157. The "international standards" requirement comes from Articles 3.1,
3.2, and 3.3. See Walker, supranote 155, at 273.
158. See id. at 271-72.
159. SPS Agreement, supranote 114, 6; Walker, supra note 155, at 271.
5; Walker, supra note 155, at
160. See SPS Agreement, supra note 114,
271.
161. SPS Agreement, supra note 114, 16.
162. Id. Annex A, 4. The Appellate Body in the Beef Hormone case held
that this did not require a minimum magnitude of risk before a member could
establish a measure. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body:
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In the Beef Hormone case, the Appellate Body ruled that the
risk assessment was a substantive requirement. 163 It held that
Article 5.1, by requiring that measures be "based on" a risk
assessment, imposed a substantive obligation that the measure
bear an "objective relationship" to the information derived from
the risk assessment. 1 64 This reversed the Panel's interpretation
that Article 5.1 required that a member establish that it
considered the results of the risk assessment when enacting an
SPS measure.' 6 5 The Appellate Body required only that risk
studies be produced in a dispute settlement hearing; it did not
166
require evidence of the EC's past reliance on such studies.
Moreover, a member is not required to conduct its own risk
assessment. 167 It can defend its measures by relying on an
assessment conducted by another member or an international
68
organization. 1

Article 5.2 specifies the nature of the risk assessment: a
regulating member "shall take into account available scientific
evidence; relevant processes and production methods; relevant
inspection, sampling and testing methods; prevalence of specific
diseases or pests; existence of pest-[free] or disease-free areas;
relevant ecological and environmental conditions;
and
quarrantive or other treatment." 6 9 The Appellate Body in the
170
Beef Hormone case held that this list was not exclusive.
Additionally, Article 5.2 indicates that the risk assessment
requirement included risks not ascertainable in a laboratory, but
"risk in human societies as they actually exist, in other words,
the actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the
real world where people live and work and die."' 7 1

In the Beef

EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Jan. 16, 1998,
1998 WL 25520, *57 (W.T.O.) [hereinafter Beef Hormone Appellate Report].
163. See id., at *54, 1193.
164. Id. The Appellate Body saw the substantive requirement as a specific
application of the basic obligation in Article 2.2, which requires that SPS
measures be based on "scientific principles" and not maintained without
"sufficient scientific evidence." Beef Hormone Appellate Report, supra note 162, at
*50.
165.
See Hughes, supranote 120, at 925.
166.
See Walker, supra note 155, at 298-99. The requirement that a
defending member have performed or obtained adequate risk assessment studies
prior to the Panel's request for them could be considered a minimal procedural
requirement. See id.
167. See id. at 298 (citing Beef Hormone Appellate Report, supra note 162,
at *53, 1 190).
168. See id.
169. SPS Agreement, supra note 114, 17.
170. See Beef Hormone Appellate Report, supranote 162, at *52, 187.
171. Id-
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Hormone case, this was held to mean that as long as the EC
could establish that the use of growth hormones in beef posed a
potential danger to human health, it would have the right to set
any level of protection it wanted.17 2
Similarly, the WTO rejected the EC's attempt to invoke the
Precautionary Principle-the idea that in cases of uncertain or
unknown health or safety risks, it is better to err on the side of
safety by regulating too stringently, rather than too leniently-in
the Beef Hormone case.173
The EC had claimed that the
unknown long-term effects of hormones justified a complete ban
to protect customers. 17 4 The Appellate Body affirmed the Panel's
conclusion that the SPS Agreement incorporated the
Precautionary Principle rendering it invalid as an independent
defense. 175
This demonstrates that caution alone, without
scientific support, probably
will not be sufficient to support a
17 6
sanitary measure.
Although the Beef Hormone decision's treatment of the
"scientifically supported" prong was less extensive than its
coverage of the "risk assessment" prong, it also offered valuable
guidance. The DSB ruled that the requirement that sanitary
measures "not be maintained without sufficient scientific
evidence" demanded specific scientific proof of the harmful effects
of the regulated item. 17 7 In the Beef Hormone case, the Appellate
Body determined that the scientific information that the EC
submitted in support of the measure did not provide sufficient
support; the evidence showed the existence of a general risk of
cancer but was not specific enough. 178 This suggests that a
member seeking to establish or maintain sanitary measures is
obliged to provide scientific studies that assess the risk posed by
17 9
the specific target of regulation when used in a specific way.
Similar to its approach to the risk assessment prong, the DSB
refused to distinguish between older evidence and "new evidence"
produced for the first time in the context of the Panel
proceeding.' 8 0

172. See id. at *53, 189-90.
173. See Franzen, supranote 107, at 417.
174. See Beef Hormone Panel Report, supranote 121, *16, 3.6.
175.
See Beef Hormone Appellate Report, supra note 162, at *70,
253;
Beef Hormone Panel Report, supra note 121, at *231, 8.249.
176.
See Franzen, supra note 107, at 418.
177. Walker, supranote 155, at 299.
178. See id. (quoting Beef Hormones Appellate Report, supra note 162, at
*56, 1 200).
179.
See id. at 299-300.
180.
See id. at 310 (quoting Beef Hormones Appellate Report, supra note
162, at *53-56,
192-209).
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Commentators have criticized the potential power of a risk
assessment and scientific justification for deciding the
"scientifically supported" prong in SPS Agreement disputes. The

WTO's SPS Agreement jurisprudence suggests that a member
seeking to sustain a sanitary regulation need only find a scientist
who would be willing to issue a report concluding that a certain
activity targeted by a regulation poses a serious risk to human
health or the environment sufficient to justify a ban on that
181
activity.
The
"necessary"
prong
of
the
"scientifically
supported/necessary" requirement has two elements. 18 2 First,
the measure must be reasonably effective in bringing about the
targeted level of protection.1 8 3 If a trade measure does not help
to protect, it cannot be justified as a means of providing
protection.184 Additionally, it must be reasonably efficient in
achieving that protection, which means that it must minimize
collateral effects on international trade. 18 5 A member may take
effective measures for achieving its level of protection, provided
that it does not have any alternative means for achieving the
same level of protection that are "significantly less restrictive to
18 6
trade."
The "arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions" requirement is
mandated by Article 2.3.187
It requires members to avoid
arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of protection
they consider appropriate in different situations, "if such
distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on
trade."1 8 8 The concept of "arbitrary or unjustifiable' has been
widely regarded as challenging to define because of the difficulty
of determining consistency among levels of protection involving
different substances, different adverse effects, and different
products. 189
For this reason, it has been suggested that
regulations should be found "arbitrary or unjustifiable" in the
most blatant and unexplainable cases only. 190 Although it is
early in the development of WTO jurisprudence, this narrow
interpretation may be emerging as the DSB's approach. The
Appellate Body found that a challenged sanitary measure violated

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See McNiel, supranote 133, at 93.
See Walker, supra note 155, at 271.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See McNiel, supranote 133, at 127-30.
SPS Agreement, supra note 114, art. 5,
See Walker, supra note 155, at 269.
See id. at 270.

5.
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this principle only once in the Australia Salmon decision. 19 In
that case, Australia had been more restrictive towards imports of
salmon than towards imports of ornamental live fish, even though
the ornamental fish posed higher risks. 192 By contrast, the
Appellate Body in the Beef Hormone case reversed the Panel's
finding of "arbitrary or unjustifiable."' 9 3 It ruled that even if the
difference in levels of protection created by the measures was
unjustifiable, the degree of difference between the two levels had
to be sufficient enough to force reversal; the degree of difference
between the "no residue" and "unlimited residue" levels was not
94
sufficient.1
Finally, the "international standards" requirement is based
on the harmonization requirements of Articles 3.1 and 3.3.195 In
evaluating whether a sanitary regulation satisfies this
requirement, the initial inquiry is whether the regulation
conforms to international standards. 19 6 The SPS Agreement
defines "internationally-accepted standards" for measures aimed
at human health as the standards established by the Codex
Alimentarius Commission (Codex Standards). 19 7 For plant life,
the appropriate standards are the International Plant Protection
Convention Standards (IPPC Standards).19 8
If a sanitary measure conforms to the appropriate
international standard, the measure is presumed to be consistent
with the SPS Agreement.' 9 9 None of the Agreement-interpreting
cases have dealt with a challenge to a regulation that conformed
to the international standards, but it is likely that the challenging
member would need to overcome a heavy burden of proof to rebut
this presumption.
On the other hand, if the measure fails to conform to
international standards, an equally heavy burden does not shift
to the regulating party, according to the Appellate Body decision
in the Beef Hormone case. 20 0 Rather, the Appellate Body held
191. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body:
Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, Oct. 20, 1998,
WT/DS18/AB/R, AB-1998-5, 1998 WL 731009, at *9-20, 28,
85-86, 93 and
124.
192. See id. at *35-40, 1 154-78.
193. Beef Hormones Appellate Report, supranote 162, 1 225.
194. See Walker, supranote 155, at 312-13 (citing Beef Hormones Appellate
Report, supra note 162, 1 236-46).
195.
See Hughes, supranote 120, at 919-28.
196.
See SPS Agreement, supra note 114, art. 3, 11 1 & 3; Hughes, supra
note 120, at 919-20.
197. See SPS Agreement, supra note 114, Annex A, 1 3.
198. See id.
199. See id. art. 3, 12.
200. See Hughes, supranote 120, at 920; Walker, supranote 155, at 314-15
& nn.306-07.
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that the harmonization of SPS measures with "international
standards" constitutes a "goal" that the agreement considered
"yet to be realized in the future." 2 0 ' It follows that a member's
failure to meet such international standards would not be
damning enough to warrant reversing the burden of proof.
Instead, the regulating member is required to "counter or refute"
the claimed inconsistency with the SPS Agreement. 20 2 Although
this is a vague formulation, it suggests a far lower burden than a
full-blown burden of proof.20 3

Since the Appellate Body viewed

the international standards as voluntary recommendations, not
norms, one commentator interpreted this ruling as converting the
obligation to base sanitary measures on existing international
standards into "an idealistic but wholly unenforceable
2 o4
objective."
If a non-conforming measure is challenged in the WTO, the
member imposing the measure must support it with a scientific
justification, which the Appellate Body interpreted in the Beef
Hormone case as requiring both a risk assessment and a
justification based on scientific evidence. 20 S In this respect, the
"international standards" requirement applies the same analysis
as the "necessary/scientifically supported" requirement.2 0 6 If the
WTO's DSB decides that the challenged measure is a sanitary
measure, it will evaluate the measure according to the SPS
Agreement. If, however, the DSB concludes that it is not a
sanitary measure, the governing provision may be Article III,
Article XI, or the TBT Agreement.
C. WTO Evaluationof a Non-Sanitary Measure
If the WTO's DSB decides that a regulation is not a sanitary
measure, the analysis turns to whether the regulation attempts to
regulate the products as products, or whether it seeks to regulate
the process of the product's production.2 0 7 Although it preceded
the Uruguay Round, the 1991
una/Dolpin case provides
guidance on how the WTO Panel and Appellate Body would
distinguish between product regulations and process-of-

201.
Beef Hormone Appellate Report, supra note 162,
165.
202. Id.
98; Walker, supra note 155, at 315 n.307.
203.
See id.
204. McNiel, supranote 133, at 123.
205.
See Beef Hormones Appellate Report, supra note 162,
supranote 120, at 923.
206.
See supranotes 159-86 and accompanying text.
207.
See Franzen, supranote 107, at 423-24.

177; Hughes,

208

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 33:183

production regulations. 20 8 In that case, Mexico and the EC
challenged a U.S. ban on the importation of tuna harvested by
methods resulting in the incidental deaths of dolphins. 209 The
Panel concluded that the ban was a "process" regulation because
it distinguished tuna products based on the method by which
2 10
they were harvested, rather than the end products themselves.
This led the Panel to rule that Article III did not apply, since
Article III applies to regulations affecting the quality, safety, or
features of the end product only. 2 1 1 Instead, it ruled that Article
XI governed this case.
If the WTO characterizes the regulation as dealing with
'products as products," the challenging state must bring its claim
under Article III or the TBT Agreement. 2 12 Considering the Article
III possibility is unnecessary, however. 2 13 As with a sanitary
measure, the challenging party would attempt to make a prima
facie case of an Article III violation. If it succeeded, the regulating
party would have to counter with an Article XX defense, which
would shift the dispute away from non-sanitary adjudication
under Article III into SPS Agreement territory. 21 4 Although the
DSB has never evaluated a challenged regulation under the TBT
Agreement, the DSB's experience with its fellow Uruguay Round
creation, the SPS Agreement, suggests that it would allow an
independent challenge under the TBT Agreement, without
requiring proof of a GATT violation. 21 5 For this to happen, one or
both of the parties would have to persuade the WTO Panel that
the regulation dealt with the products themselves, not the
2 16
process of their production.
If, on the other hand, the WTO finds that the regulation
regulates the process of the product's production, Article XI
would govern the challenge. 21 7 In that situation, the challenging

208. See United States-Restriction on Imports of Tuna, Sept. 3, 1991,
GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) (Panel report not adopted by the GATT
Contracting Parties) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin]; Franzen, supra note 107, at 424.
209. See Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 208,
5.1-5.4.
210. Seeid. 5.11.
211. See Franzen, supra note 107, at 411-12.
212. See id at 423-29 (analyzing a potential challenge to the U.S. Organic
Food Production Act of 1990 as a non-sanitary measure that deals with products
as products).
213. See id. at 428-29.
214. See id. at 429.
215.
See supranotes 131-35 and accompanying text.
216.
See id. (describing the process of persuading the DSB that a regulation
is a sanitary regulation).
217. See GATT, supra note 105, art. III, 4 (indicating that GATT Article III
does not apply to regulations based on the process by which a product is made or
manufactured); Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 208, 1 5.10; Franzen, supra note 107,
at 429.
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party would attempt to show that the regulation constitutes a
prima facie violation of Article XI. 2 18 If it does, the regulating
member would counter with one of Article XI's internal
21 9
exceptions.
1. Evaluation as a Regulation of the Product as a Product: The
TBT Agreement
If the regulation is a non-sanitary regulation that controls
the product as a product, it is open to challenge under the TBT
Agreement.
In passing the TBT Agreement, GATT members
sought to "ensure [that] technical regulations and standards ...
2 20
do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade."
The TBT Agreement applies to all industrial and agricultural
products. 2 2 1 Although the Beef Hormone, Australia Salmon, and
Japan-Agriculture cases provide some guidance as to how the
WTO might evaluate an SPS Agreement case, no counterparts
exist for the TBT Agreement; instead, this is an undeveloped area
222
of WTO jurisprudence.
Included in the definition of technical regulations are
documents that contain "product characteristics or their related
processes and production methods," which "may ... include...
labelling requirements as they apply to product, process or
production method."2 23 Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement forbids
technical regulations and standards that are "prepared, adopted,
or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating
unnecessary obstacles to international trade" and requires that
the regulations and standards "fulfill a legitimate objective." 22 4
Legitimate objectives include prevention of deceptive practices,
protection of human health and safety, and protection of the
environment. 225
Additionally, Article 2.8 of the Agreement
requires that "[w]herever appropiate . . . technical regulations
[shall be] based on product requirements in terms of performance
rather than design or descriptive characteristics." 2 2 6
Unlike the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement does not
require regulations to have a scientific basis.2 2 7 This has led to

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

See id. at 424-25.
See id. at 414.
TBT Agreement, supra note 115, preamble.
Id. art. 1, 3.
See Franzen, supra note 107, at 420.
TBT Agreement, supranote 115, Annex 1, 1 1.
Id. art. 2, 2.
See id.
Id art. 2, 8.
See generally, TBT Agreement, supra note 115.
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one commentator's suggestion that a regulating party, aware that
its ostensibly health-minded regulation was not supported by
credible scientific evidence, might be able to argue that the SPS
Agreement did not apply because the regulation was not intended
to protect human health or plant life. 2 28
Instead, it could
contend that it adopted the regulation for some other legitimate
purpose, such as harmonizing intra-EC regulations, which would
make the TBT Agreement the governing provision. 2 29 Although
the commentator contends that a legislative history that strongly
suggests that the measure did have a sanitary purpose-as was
the case with the EC in the Beef Hormone case-should estop
such a claim, he indicates that it would be a closer case for a
multi-purpose regulation. 2 30 Since the WTO did not address the
question of whether the Beef Hormone regulations violated the
TBT Agreement, and the relevant texts fail to provide guidance,
231
this issue remains open for debate.
2. Evaluation as a Regulation of the Process of Production: GATT
Article XI
GATT Article XI restricts prohibitions or restrictions on
importation of products. 23 2 The prohibition encompasses both de
jure and de facto import prohibitions and restrictions. Although
Article XI strongly disfavors such regulations, it does provide
limited exemptions.2 3 3
Article XI Section 2(c)(i) allows an
exemption for bans of agricultural products in
certain
situations. 2 3
When the WTO interpreted this exemption in a
1988 challenge to a Japanese agricultural restriction, it
concluded that a party invoking the exemption must meet seven
criteria: (1) only import restrictions, not prohibitions, are
permitted; (2) the restriction must be on an agricultural product;
(3) the government must restrict domestic supplies of the

228.
See McNiel, supra note 133, at 115.
229. See id. at 115-16.
230. See id.
231.
See id. at 116.
232. See GATT, supra note 105, art. XI. ("No prohibitions or restrictions
other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas,
import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained...
on the importation of any product.
").
233. See id. art. XI, 2 ("The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall
not extend to the following [exceptions]....").
234. See id. art. XI,
2(c). ("Import restrictions on any agricultural ...
product ... necessary to the enforcement of [a] governmental measures... which
operate: (i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product..., or, if there is
no substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for
which the imported product can be directly substituted....").
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product; (4) restrictions must be imposed on "like" products; (5)
import restrictions must be necessary for the enforcement of the
domestic restriction; (6) public notice must be given; and (7)
import restrictions must not reduce the proportional market
share of each importing country. 23 5 This narrow construction
has made it difficult for a regulating party to employ this
23 6
defense.

V. WTO ADJUDICATION OF A UNITED STATES CHALLENGE TO THE
LABELING REQUIREMENTS

If the United States were to initiate a WTO challenge to the
EC's GMO labeling requirements, it is conceivable that the parties
could settle their dispute at the consultation stage. 23 7 Given the
shakiness of scientific support for the regulations, settling at that
stage may be wise for the EC. Settling a weak case at the
consultation stage may allow a regulating party to maintain some
portion of its regulation, but an unfavorable WTO ruling would
force it to abolish the regulation entirely. This section of the
Note, however, assumes that the challenge has passed the
consultation stage and moved to WTO adjudication. Presumably,
the United States initially would attempt to challenge the GMOlabeling requirements as sanitary measures under the SPS
Agreement. If it were unable to persuade the WTO that the
requirements are sanitary measures, it would next attempt to
challenge them as non-sanitary measures under the TBT
Agreement or GATT Article XI.
A. Adjudication of the GMO-Labeling Requirements as Sanitary
Measures
The GMO-labeling requirements would be adjudicated as
sanitary measures if the United States, the EC, or both were able
to persuade the WTO Panel that the requirements are sanitary
measures and should be evaluated under the SPS Agreement,
independently of GATT. 23 8 Given the volatility of the scientific
basis for the regulations, the EC may not want to take this
approach; conversely, the United States may favor it for the same
reason.

235.
See Japan-Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products,
Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 163, 223-27 (1989).
236.
See Franzen, supranote 107, at 414.
237.
See supranotes 77-79 and accompanying text.
238.
See supranotes 131-35 and accompanying text.
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Determining whether the United States would be able to
demonstrate both elements necessary to establish that the GMOlabeling requirements are sanitary measures-a sanitary purpose
and an effect on trade-is difficult. 23 9 The problem lies in the
first prong: whether the regulation has a sanitary purpose. 2M
The GMO-labeling requirements describe their purpose as
creating uniform regulations among the EC member states. They
also claim a desire to clarify labeling for consumers. 2 4 1 Nowhere
do they mention anything about being passed for the purpose of
protecting "human, animal or plant life or health."2 42 If the WTO
Panel accepts the stated purposes at face value, the United States
would fail to establish the first element of the test, which would
mean that it could not challenge the GMO-labeling requirements
under the SPS Agreement.
Several factors suggest, however, that the actual purpose of
the requirements was "to protect human, animal or plant life or
health" from some sort of risk. The most prominent is the fact
that the EC passed the requirements in response to a public
outcry fueled by the fear that GMOs would have dire
consequences for human health and the environment. 2m In that
light, it is easy to imagine that the labeling requirement has a
sanitary purpose. The presence of the labels could serve to warn
consumers that the food product contained inside may be
hazardous to their health. Additionally, although the connection
between regulation and risk prevention is more attenuated, the
labels could deter environmentally-conscious consumers from
purchasing products that contained GMOs which would give
agricultural producers an incentive to refrain from using them.
This, in turn, would protect plant life from hazards like the
runaway patch of oilseed rape in England. 2 44 Since regulating
members admitted sanitary purposes of their regulations in all
three previous SPS Agreement decisions, those decisions give no
guidance on how the WTO would resolve this problem.
It would be considerably easier for the United States to
satisfy the "affect international trade" prong.2 45 The labeling
requirements stand to hurt U.S. agricultural trade in Europe in
several ways. First, the requirements would force GMO-reliant
U.S. producers to spend more money to ensure that their

239.
240.
241.

See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
See id.
See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.

242.

See generally id.

243.
244.
245.

See supra notes 17-28, 35-58 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 23-25 and accompanying text.
See supranote 133 and accompanying text.

2000]

EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S LABELING REQUIRMENTS

213

products would meet the labeling standards. 24 6 So labeled, those
products would probably be disfavored by much of the European
consuming public.2 4 7 Moreover, if the U.S. producer elected to
bypass that expense and send its products to the EC states
without labels, it is likely that consumers would shy away from
2 48
those unlabeled products.
If the United States cannot persuade the WTO that it should
move directly to the SPS Agreement, it is unlikely that it would be
able to succeed via the other route to the SPS Agreement. The
other route would constitute demonstrating a prima facie
violation of GATT Article III and forcing the EC to plead an
affirmative defense under Article XX, which would be scrutinized
by the SPS Agreement. 24 9 The United States could show that the
GMO-labeling requirements affect the sale of food products
containing GMOs and that their products are "like" the European
agricultural products being treated more favorably.2 5 0
The
problem, however, would be that the regulations, as written,
apply to European goods only; the disadvantaged U.S. producers
comply solely because of market necessities. 25 ' Because of this,
the regulations would not be considered "universal," and the
United States would not be able to establish all three elements of
25 2
a prima facie violation.
If the WTO Panel decides to characterize the GMO-labeling
requirements as sanitary regulations, the next step would be to
evaluate whether the requirements pass the "scientifically
supported/necessary," "arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminates,"
and "international standards" requirements. 25 3 To be sustained,
the GMO-labeling requirements would have to satisfy all three
requirements. Based on the previous WTO decisions and current
scientific knowledge, the GMO-labeling requirements would be
likely to fail the "scientifically supported/necessary" and the
"international standards" prongs of this analysis.
The GMO-labeling requirements would probably fail to satisfy
both the "scientifically supported" and "necessary" prongs of the
"scientifically supported/necessary" requirement.
Given the

246.
See supranotes 61-65 and accompanying text.
247.
See id.
248.
See supranotes 59-60 and accompanying text.
249.
See supranotes 136-45 and accompanying text.
250.
See supra notes 137, 140-43 and accompanying text (describing
"affects sale" and 'like" elements of three-part test).
251.
See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (describing how GMOlabeling requirements apply to European goods only).
252.
See supranotes 138-39 and accompanying text (describing "universal"
element of three-part test).
253.
See supranotes 155-57 and accompanying text.
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current state of scientific knowledge, the EC would be unlikely to
demonstrate to the WTO's satisfaction that its regulation was
based on a risk assessment and not maintained without
sufficient scientific knowledge. 25 4 The WTO's requirement for
specificity in scientific proof would be particularly harmful for the
EC's cause, since no currently-existing studies show that the
GMOs subject to the labeling requirements pose a specific threat
to human or plant health. 25s
Even if accepted as true, Dr.
Pusztai's findings on genetically-modified potatoes would fail for
lack of specificity. The EC would need to produce a similar study
25 6
showing adverse effects from genetically-modified soya or com.
If the DSB found that the EC based its regulations on
insufficient scientific knowledge, the regulations would also fail
the risk assessment requirement; without a scientifically-proven
risk, a risk assessment that results in regulation is necessarily
insufficient. The DSB's express rejection of the Precautionary
Principle in the Beef Hormone case would also be harmful for the
EC. 2 57 Perhaps the strongest possible grounds for sustaining the
GMO-labeling requirements would have been that they protect
25 8
against an unknown or uncertain risk.
Moreover, it also follows that the requirements would not be
sufficiently "necessary" to survive WTO scrutiny.25 9 If the GMOs
subject to the labeling requirements do not have a harmful effect
on human health, the requirements could not be considered
aeffective" for achieving a sanitary goal. 2 60 Additionally, the
United States could challenge the requirements' efficiency in
protecting the environment on the grounds that it would be less
trade-restrictive to require careful cultivation of the crops when
they are grown in EC member states. Such regulation would
have a less detrimental effect on the trade efforts of non-EC
members than the labeling requirements.
The GMO-labeling requirements would be likely to pass the
"arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminates" requirement. 2 6 1 Based
on its limited treatment of this requirement, the WTO seems
inclined to find a violation in the most blatant cases only, such as
when Australia banned the importation of Canadian salmon while

254. See supranotes 29-35, 161-81 and accompanying text.
255. See supranotes 29-31, 177-79 and accompanying text.
256. See supranotes 32-35 and accompanying text.
257. See supranotes 173-76 and accompanying text.
258. See supranote 35 and accompanying text.
259.
See supranotes 182-86 and accompanying text.
260. Cf. Walker, supra note 155, at 271 ("If a trade-restrictive measure does
not in fact help to protect, then it cannot be justified as a means of providing
protection.").

261.

See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
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No equally
permitting the entry of a more harmful fish. 2 6 2
obvious counterpart to the genetically-modified agriculture is
permitted to enter the European markets unscathed by
regulation, so the DSB probably would not find that the
requirements "arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate" against
international trade.
Finally, the GMO-labeling requirements would probably fail
the "international standards" requirement. 26 3 Codex's standards
recommend mandatory labeling when the genetic modification
creates material differences in food products.2 64 This suggests
that the WTO would not regard the labeling requirements as
Resolution of this issue,
being based on Codex standards.
however, would not be tremendously significant; it would
determine whether the GMO-labeling requirements were
presumed valid, with the possibility of a U.S. rebuttal or whether
the EC would be forced to "counter or refute" the presumption5
26
that the requirements were in violation of the SPS Agreement.
Since the requirements lack any scientific support, they would be
likely to fail regardless of the presumption.
B. Adjudication of the GMO-Labeling Requirements as NonSanitary Measures
Should the DSB decline to characterize the GMO-labeling
requirements as sanitary measures, the United States would have
to challenge them as non-sanitary measures under the TBT
Agreement or GATT Article XI. 2 66 In evaluating the GMO-labeling
requirements as non-sanitary measures, the DSB's threshold
inquiry would be whether it should view the requirements as
regulating the products as products, or regulating the processes
of their production. 26 7 If it regards the labeling requirements as
targeting the products themselves, the requirements would have
2 68
to satisfy the TBT Agreement for the DSB to sustain them.
Conversely, if the DSB characterizes the EC regulations as aimed
at the process of production, GATT Article XI would be the
2 69
governing provision.

262.
263.

See id.
See supra notes 195-206 and accompanying text.

264.

See NOrINGHAM, supranote 1, at 145.
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266.
267.
268.
269.

See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 212-19 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 207-11 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 212-16 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 217-19 and accompanying text.
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Either interpretation is plausible. By insuring that the
consumers are aware that they are receiving products free of any
"unnatural" ingredients, the labeling requirements could be
considered to regulate the "end product."2 70 On the other hand,
the fact that European consumers prefer GMO-free products
because they perceive that "natural" products are more
environmentally friendly than their genetically-engineered
counterparts-which, for example, might endanger the
neighboring ecosystem with "super weeds"--suggests that the
labeling requirements may be a process classification, not
271
affecting the end product.
1. Adjudication of the GMO-Labeling Requirements as
Regulations of Products as Products
If the WTO Panel regards the EC's GMO-labeling
requirements as non-sanitary regulations of the end products
themselves, the regulations would have to satisfy the TBT
Agreement in order to be sustained. 2 72 The United States could
attack the labeling requirements as being technical regulations
that serve to protect the domestic farming industries of the EC
member states.2 73 Since the TBT Agreement includes "labeling
requirements" in its definition of technical regulations, the GMO-

27 4
labeling requirements would be appropriate subject matter.
Although no case law exists to provide guidance for
determining how the DSB might rule in a TBT Agreement case,
the text of the Agreement suggests that the GMO-labeling
requirements would fail to satisfy its demands. When evaluated
against Article 2.2, the EC probably would be able to demonstrate
that the GMO-labeling requirements have a "legitimate objective,"
since the TBT Agreement considers the desire for uniform
regulations legitimate.2 7 5
It would have difficulty, however,

270.
Cf. Franzen, supra note 107, at 424 (suggesting that the WTO could
regard the Organic Food Production Act of 1990 as dealing with products as
products because "a strong argument can be made that the organic certification
requirements are intended to insure contaminant-free products by regulating the
process inputs.").
271.
Cf. id. (suggesting that the WTO could regard the Organic Food
Production Act of 1990 as dealing with the importation of products because 'the
fact that some organic processes are preferred precisely because they are more
environmentally friendly than conventional methods points toward a process
classification not affecting the end products.").
272.
See supra Part IV.C. 1.
273.
Cf. Franzen, supra note 107, at 426 (indicating that '[u]nder the TBT
Agreement, the [Organic Food Production Act of 1990] could be attacked as a
technical regulation protecting the domestic organic food industry.").
274. TBT Agreement, supra note 115, Annex 1A.
275.
See id. art. 2, 2; supranotes 223-25 and accompanying text.
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proving that the requirements did not have the "effect of creating
unnecessary obstacles to international trade."2 7 6 The labeling
requirements certainly stand to present barriers to trade; the
EC's likelihood of proving that the need for regulative uniformity
is serious enough to be "necessary" is questionable.
Additionally, the GMO-labeling requirements would be likely
to fail Article 2.8, which requires states to base technical
27 7
Although
regulations on product performance requirements.
the DSB made the point moot by deciding the Beef Hormone case
on SPS Agreement grounds, the United States advanced the
argument that such regulations violated the TBT Agreement
because the use of growth hormones did not lead to end-products
278
that were different from those produced without the hormones.
Here, it could make the analogous claim that the GMO-labeling
requirements are not justified because products produced with
genetically-modified ingredients are no different than those with
"natural" ingredients. Since scientific data suggests that the
products are equivalent, the DSB would probably find that the
279
labeling requirements failed to reflect product performance.
2. Adjudication of the GMO-Labeling Requirements as
Regulations of the Process of Production
If the WTO Panel characterizes the EC's GMO-labeling
requirements as non-sanitary regulations of the process of
production, the United States would have the burden of
establishing that the requirements are a prohibition or restriction
on the importation of products, and as such, a prima facie
violation of GATT Article XI. 2 80 This may be quite easy. The
GMO-labeling requirements would cause the U.S. producers to be
excluded from the European market because they would not be
able to sell their goods competitively. If the U.S. producers elect
to label their goods, they would be more costly to produce than
their European counterparts. 28 1
Additionally, the European
consumers might regard labeled goods as hazardous to their
health and refuse to buy them. 28 2
Moreover, if the U.S.

276. TBT Agreement, supranote 115, art. 2, 1 2.
277.
See id. art. 2, 8.
278.
See Franzen, supranote 107, at 420, 426-27.
279.
See supranotes 29-35 and accompanying text.
280.
See GATT, supra note 105, art. XI; see also Franzen, supra note 107, at
424 (describing how a challenger to the Organic Food Production Act of 1990
would develop a prima facie case of an Article XI violation).
281. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
282. See NOTINGHAM, supranote 1, at 146 ("Labelling all the foods that use
genetic engineering somewhere in their production would send the consumer
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producers choose not to label their goods, the European
customers also would likely be dissuaded from purchasing
28 3
them.
The EC would, in turn, attempt to refute the prima facie
violation by invoking Article XI's internal exemption for
agricultural products. 2 84 It would probably be able to satisfy
most of the seven criteria necessary for sustaining a restriction
on the importation of agricultural products. 28 5
The final
element-that the import restrictions not reduce the proportional
market share of each importing country-would be difficult to
satisfy, however. 28 6 Since U.S. producers rely on geneticallymodified agriculture to a greater extent than their counterparts in
other countries, the GMO-labeling requirements would be likely
to reduce their market share significantly; fewer GMO-reliant
countries would suffer a smaller reduction. Because of this, the
EC would be unable to prove permissible restrictions on the
287
importation of agricultural products.
VI. CONCLUSION

The current state of scientific knowledge about GMOs,
relevant WTO case law, and texts of the GATT, SPS Agreement,
and TBT Agreement suggest that the EC's GMO-labeling
requirements would not survive a U.S. challenge, regardless of
how the DSB would choose to characterize the regulations. While
it seems apparent that the EC did not pass the regulations for the
2 88
purpose of protecting the agricultural sector of its economy,
signals that the foods were in some way unsafe, according to the food industry,
when this is not the case. Labels could, therefore, unjustly stigmatize genetically
modified foods.").
283. See supranote 59 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 232-36 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
286. See id.
287. The EC could also make an Article XX defense to the Article XI claim,
but it would not be effective. See Franzen, supra note 107, at 425-26. It would
likely assert that the GMO-labeling requirements are necessary to protect human
or plant health, and, as such, are exempted from GATT obligations by Article XX
(b). See id. (detailing the application of this defense to a challenge to the Organic
Food Production Act of 1990).
That defense, however, would lead to the
conclusion that the labeling requirements be viewed as sanitary measures; this, in
turn, would make the SPS Agreement the controlling provision. See id. Even as a
non-sanitary measure, the GMO-labeling requirements would probably fail under
Article XX(b) because they are not necessary to protect human or plant health.
See id.
288. See de Jonquie'res, supra note 16, at 15 ("The [U.S.] initially blamed
European resistance on straightforward protectionism. But recent levels of
anxiety in Europe about food safety, particularly since the outbreak of 'mad cow'
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the WTO's focus on the projectionist effect of a challenged
regulation makes them just as invalid as if they had been passed
as part of a conspiracy to protect home-grown agriculture.
Moreover, even though the labeling requirements would be
significantly less trade-restrictive than other possible regulatory
techniques-such as a ban on GMOs-they would still run afoul
of the WTO's mandate. The combination of the vulnerability of
the GMO-labeling requirements and their likely adverse impact
on U.S. agricultural interests suggests that it would be wise for
the United States to challenge the requirements before the WTO.
The likelihood of success for the challenge would be subject
to change, however, if the EC could produce a scientific study
showing that the regulated products caused specific harm. Then,
its chances of sustaining the GMO-labeling requirements under
the SPS Agreement would increase significantly. Additionally,
since the DSB is not bound by stare decisis, it is always capable
of altering its interpretations of the GATT, SPS Agreement, and
TBT Agreement.
Although the significance of the U.S. interest involved
would probably justify challenging
the GMO-labeling
requirements, the United States should also consider the
possible consequences of a favorable ruling by the DSB. If the
WTO forces the EC to repeal regulations which reflect a strong
popular sentiment, the WTO would risk facing similarly strong
disfavor from the European people, who would probably view it
as valuing trade over their health and environment. The trend
for self-labeling of products by companies that deal in GMOs
would probably expand, 2 8 9 since those companies would view
self-labeling as a good way to win over the skeptical European

disease, has forced [U.S.] officials to [recognize] that the explanation is more
complex.").
289. See Andrew Porter, Shops Play It Safe as Consumers Call Shots:
Retailers Say Foods Containing Genetically Modified Ingredients Are Clearly
Labelled, W. MORNING NEWS (Plymouth), Feb. 16, 1999, at 4 (describing efforts by
U.K. supermarkets to label products that include GMOs).
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consumers.
Additionally, a WTO ruling against the GMOlabeling requirements may provoke the EC to overhaul its much2 90
criticized approach to evaluating GMOs.
John Stephen Fredland'

290.
See de Jonquie'res, supra note 16, at 15 (indicating that the EU's
system for regulating food safety, in which "requests for product approvals are
trundled through a labyrinth of committees," leads to "long delays land
undermines] public accountability" and "encourages decisions based on political
opportunism and scaremongering, not scientific evidence.").
* J.D. Candidate, 2000 Vanderbilt University; B.A. Rice University. The
author wishes to thank his family and friends for their love, enthusiasm, and
support, especially his parents, John William Fredland, Jr. and Kathleen Terleski.
The author also wishes to thank Dr. John S. Ambler, since it was his suggestion
that made this Note possible.

